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The contract between Brookhaven Science Associates (BSA), LLC and the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the operation of the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) provides that the Laboratory must conform to all security orders and requirements of DOE. DOE is empowered by Congress to issue such rules and orders as are necessary to promote National Defense and Security.
The Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5670.3, "Counterintelligence Program", dated 9-4-92, requires the development and implementation of a counterintelligence program in order to comply with Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities" of 12-4-81, and such Executive orders or directives as may supersede or work in conjunction with it.
Brookhaven National Laboratory maintains an effective Counterintelligence Program. The Program embraces the requirements of the Presidential Decision Directives, the Department of Energy Order 5670.3, "Counterintelligence Program", and has been enhanced by the Secretary of Energy's Counterintelligence Implementation Plan to provide a reasonable and unobtrusive site specific counterintelligence program.
The purpose of the Counterintelligence Program is to deter and neutralize foreign industrial or intelligence activities in the United States directed at or involving DOE programs, facilities, technology, personnel, unclassified sensitive information, proprietary information, and classified matter.
The responsibility for the BNL Counterintelligence (CI) Program resides with the Laboratory Director. The Deputy Director for Operations is charged with management of the program. The BNL Counterintelligence Program Manager (CPM), also known as the local Counterintelligence official, is responsible for the management, administration, implementation, and maintenance of the BNL CI Program. The CPM works for and reports directly to the Deputy Laboratory Director for Operations on all CI matters and has direct access to the Laboratory Director.
The CI Program is applicable to all Laboratory employees engaged in official foreign travel and for those employees who interact with foreign nationals, or work with or have access to classified, sensitive unclassified or proprietary technology or information (See SPI 5-09, Visits and Assignments of Foreign Nationals for examples).
(The definitions, as defined below, have been extracted from DOE Order 5670.3, "Counterintelligence Program", and information developed by and provided from the DOE Office of Counterintelligence.)
CLOSE CONTACT: For DOE purposes, the term "close contact" with a foreign national is defined as a relationship that (a) involves bonds of affection and/or personal obligation, and/or (b) where the employee and foreign national share private time together in a public or private setting where sensitive professional and personal information is discussed or is the target of discussion. Information discussed between an employee and foreign national may make the contact reportable even though the relationship has not reached the stage involving bonds of affection and/or obligation. Close contacts are defined as:
Sexual or otherwise intimate relationships. Personnel do not have to report one-time sexual or otherwise intimate contact with a foreign national if (a) there will be no future contact with the foreign national, and (b) the foreign national does not seek classified or sensitive information, and (c) there is no indication that personnel are the target of actual or attempted exploitation. However, if it is likely that future social contact with the foreign national will occur-even if the future contact is expected to be in non-close (non-sexual) social settings-the relationship must be reported as a close and continuing contact. If personnel have sexual or otherwise intimate contact on more than one occasion with the same foreign national, regardless of circumstances or likelihood for follow-up contact, the relationship must be reported as a close and continuing contact, even if there is no expectation of future contact. Such contact must be reported regardless of whether the foreign national's full name and other biographic data are known or unknown.
Non-sexual, essentially private, social contacts, where the employee and foreign national share private time together in a public or private setting, and where sensitive professional and personal information is discussed or is the focus of discussion. Such a relationship may or may not involve the establishment of bonds of affection and/or personal obligation (akin to a traditional dating relationship).
Other personal and family relationships, such as foreign national friends from the community, social or sporting clubs, or neighbors with whom the employee shares private time together in a public or private setting, and sensitive professional and personal information is discussed or is the focus of discussion.
Any foreign national business associate or other financial relationship (but not including routine payments made by personnel for domestic or commercial services such as maid service or other non-live-in domestic help).
Any foreign national with whom personnel share living quarters. In addition to relationships involving bonds of affection, sexual contact, or other intimacy, other shared residential contacts include foreign national roommates, live-in domestic help, live-in foreign national exchange students, and house guests.
CONTINUING CONTACT: For DOE purposes, the threshold at which a close contact becomes continuing (triggering the requirement to report the relationship) varies with the nature of the contact. A continuing contact is defined as:
Any unofficial, non-work-related business or other financial relationship with a foreign national must be reported promptly (within five business days), even if the contact was limited to one occasion regardless of whether personnel think the relationship will continue. (As noted in paragraph 1(d) above, this does not include routine payments made by personnel for domestic or commercial services.)
Regarding all other, essentially private, non-work-related close contacts, such as dating relationships without sex and/or intimacy, and social and family friendships, whether of the same or opposite sex, such as those enumerated in paragraph 1(b) and (c) above, the relationship must be reported promptly when it has developed to the point where personal information is shared, whether that of the employee or foreign national, and/or in circumstances where the social contact is probing for such information, including information related to the workplace. Some indicators that the relationship has developed to this point are when your comments, or the social contact's inquiries, have reached a reporting threshold. Examples include:
The foreign national seeks details about your workplace, your official responsibilities and/or activities and/or identities and activities of coworkers (please remember the solicitation, by a foreign national, of classified or sensitive information requires immediate reporting of the foreign national);
The foreign national attempts to exploit you in any regard due to your relationship;
You or the foreign national are confiding very personal information, such as:
As the social relationship evolves, employees are strongly encouraged to advise their Counterintelligence Program Manager (CPM) of details of the contact. This will permit the employee to seek guidance on the risks the relationship poses to the individual, co-workers, the DOE site and its mission. As always, if you have doubts about whether or not to report a foreign national contact, consult with your CPM.
Do not interpret the terms close and continuing according to personal opinion. If in doubt, always ask for guidance or report the contact to the CPM for the record.
COLLECTION: The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence. Obtaining information or intelligence information in any manner, including direct observation, liaison with official agencies, or solicitation from official, unofficial, or public sources. The act of employing instruments and/or equipment, i.e., video recorders, photographs, tape recorders, closed circuit television (CCTV), computers and files, etc. to obtain qualitative or quantitative data from the test or operation of foreign systems.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI): Activity intended to detect, counteract, and/or prevent espionage and other clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage, and international terrorist activities by or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons.
INFORMATION: Unevaluated material of every description, at all levels or reliability, and from any source that may contain intelligence information.
INQUIRY: The collection and examination of information to include records review and interviews to assess indicators of espionage.
INVESTIGATION: A comprehensive examination of facts or other pertinent information conducted by an authorized agency.
INTELLIGENCE: The product resulting from the collection, collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all collected information.
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: A generic term used to encompass any or all of the efforts and endeavors undertaken by intelligence organizations, including activities pursuant to collection, analysis, production, dissemination, and covert or clandestine activities. When used in the context of Executive Order 12333, the term intelligence activity means all actions that agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to the Order.
In accordance with DOE Order 5670.3, outlining the, "Counterintelligence Program," and the Presidential Decision Directives PDD-12, "Security Awareness and Reporting of Foreign Contacts" and PDD-61, "U.S. Department of Energy Counterintelligence Program," a Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) Counterintelligence Program has been established. The Program has been designed to deter and counteract site-specific foreign industrial or intelligence threats against BNL personnel, information, activities, facilities, and technologies.
The Program supports and strengthens the overall security posture at BNL. Integral elements of the Program include partnering and cooperation from several programs at BNL. The partnering relationships include direct interactions between the BNL Counterintelligence Program Manager and the following programs.
The BNL CI Program includes:
A BNL Counterintelligence Program Manager to manage, administrate, implement, and maintain an effective CI program.
Development and implementation of a Counterintelligence awareness program for all employees. The elements of the awareness program shall assure that employees are made aware of current intelligence threats and operational requirements relative to:
CI awareness program for new employees, initial comprehensive security and annual refresher briefings for employees with access authorization (clearance).
Ensure that the privacy of employees and their freedom of association are not intruded upon.
Inclusion of partnering with the Senior Counterintelligence Program Manager (SCIO) of the DOE Brookhaven Group on CI matters.
Providing support, by the CPM, to the DOE Office of Counterintelligence.
The CI program requires that employees report to the Counterintelligence Program Manager, all close and continuing contacts, as defined above, with foreign nationals or any suspicious activities by foreign nationals during work related events, i.e., foreign or domestic travel, sponsoring or hosting individuals, attending seminars or conferences, CRADA projects, work for others, etc. See Attachment "A" for Reporting Form. The BNL Counterintelligence Program Manager (CPM), Gary M. Gross, can be reached at extension 2234 for reporting purposes or questions related to the CI program and related matters..
PRE-FOREIGN-TRAVEL BRIEFINGS - It is the responsibility of any BNL traveler to inform the BNL Counterintelligence Office, ext. 2234, of any official travel plans that will involve trips to foreign countries. This especially applies to those travelers who are going to sensitive countries (See SPI 5-09 for a list of Sensitive Countries). Additionally, for trips domestically, where there is an expectation of interaction with foreign nationals, the pre-foreign travel briefing service is available.
The Pre-Foreign-Travel briefing will provide the individual with information they need to be aware of, including intelligence gathering methods which they may exposed to, and defensive countermeasures and precautions they should consider.
POST-FOREIGN-TRAVEL DEBRIEFINGS - Employees traveling to sensitive countries are required to contact the CPM to schedule a post-foreign-travel debriefing upon completion of the trip.
HOST DEBRIEFING - Individuals hosting foreign nationals at the laboratory may be randomly selected for debriefing by the CPM. Additionally, individuals hosting foreign nationals must comply with the requirements and responsibilities of the Laboratory's Standard Practice Instruction (SPI) 5-09, "Visits and Assignments of Foreign Nationals."
PRE-FOREIGN-TRAVEL BRIEFING - The purpose of the defensive CI Pre-Foreign Travel briefing is to sensitize the traveler to Foreign Intelligence Threats. The traveler will be provided a country specific briefing to include all current threat information and suggested protective countermeasures.
DEBRIEFINGS - Debriefings/Administrative Inquiries are the primary method used to gather information and details related to CI contacts. Debriefs that are conducted as part of the CI Program include, Post-Foreign Travel Debriefing, Foreign National Contact Debriefing, Administrative Inquiries, and Host Debriefings.
POST-FOREIGN TRAVEL DEBRIEFINGS - The CPM will conduct post-foreign travel debriefs of travelers who have traveled to sensitive countries on official business.
HOST DEBRIEFINGS - Hosts of foreign national visitors or guests at the Laboratory may be randomly selected for a debriefing by the CPM.
Attachment A: Close and Continue Contact Form (MS Word)
The only official copy of this file is the one on-line in SBMS. Before using a printed copy, verify that it is the most current version by checking the document issue date on the BNL SBMS website.
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